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ABSTRACT

The political control of the bureaucracy is a major theme in public administration scholarship, particularly in delegation theory. There is a wide range of policy instruments suitable for the purpose of control. In practice, however, there are economic and political limitations to deploying the full arsenal of control tools. We explore the implications of the costs of control by examining cross-country patterns of fire alarms. We identify and categorise a set of control instruments and their rationale using accountability typologies. We then code the presence or absence of different instruments by drawing on an original dataset of 14 instruments in a population of 17 European countries. Using configurational analysis, we analyse cross-country patterns. In the conclusions, we reflect on the patterns identified, their implications for controlling bureaucracy in advanced democracies and the literature on administrative traditions. We finally propose how our empirical findings may be extended to further explanatory analyses.
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CONTROLLING BUREAUCRACIES WITH FIRE ALARMS: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND CROSS-COUNTRY PATTERNS


Introduction
Since the 1980s, substantial policy competences have flowed toward agencies and regulators, raising the problems of coping with power dispersion in advanced democracies and the European Union (EU) (Jensen et al, 2014 [introduction to this special issue]). As the editors of the special issue put it, for political scientists the first step is to define and carefully operationalize coordination and control mechanisms (Jensen et al, 2014), and to use concepts to map variation and patterns.
A classic approach to the identification of control mechanisms is to think in terms of transaction cost politics (Huber and Shipan, 2000: 46). Transaction-cost analysis provides the rationale for the adoption of different types of control instruments. Yet, as Huber and Shipan make clear, although there is a rationale for the adoption of control instruments, governments do not adopt them all. There is an element of political cost in adopting a given control tool. Empirically, we see this reflected in the fact that the process of global circulation of control tools across the OECD has not resulted in convergence around a single mix or ecology of instruments (Mahon and McBride, 2009). As Jensen et al (2014) argue, variation in cross-national diffusion may depend on particular features of the political systems. Before asking why a given system goes for one mix or another, we have to go back one step and provide a map of cross-country variation based on theory-grounded expectations about different control instruments.
At the outset, we reason that governments can either ‘police patrol’ the bureaucracy or adopt ‘fire alarms’ (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). The latter takes us into the territory of administrative procedures (Stewart, 1975), and of provisions that constrain policy drifts by making bureaucracies accountable to an array of interests. According to theory, interests can better detect, prevent and even correct policy drifts without new legislative interventions; at the same time, however, they can change the role of the political principals from policymakers to ombudsmen (McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989; Lupia and McCubbins 1994; Balla 1998; Mulgan 2003). So, differences across countries rest on which interests are enfranchised by the accountability provisions to serve as ‘fire alarms’, but also on how far such accountability obligations go.
To select and organise empirics, we unfold fire-alarm accountability in two analytical dimensions – accessibility and answerability. Drawing on configurational analysis (Ragin 1987, 2008), we conceptualise them as special combinations of presence/absence of significant administrative devices. We then systematically detect their presence in 17 European countries in 2012. Cases so become empirical instances of provision configurations, which expose cross-country patterns of accountability after logical ‘compression’ (Elman 2005). We conclude by reflecting on these patterns, and discuss the implications for theory and future explanatory research.

Literature review and research questions
There are a variety of research traditions concerning the relationship between elected principals and bureaucratic agents (Harlow, 2006). In transaction cost politics (Hubert and Shipan, 2000) political principals face problems of asymmetric information (Hubert and Shipan, 2000: 27) and credible commitment (Moe, 1990). In response, governments can adopt instruments to control agency drift according to two different strategies.
Traditional police patrol devices such as hearings, investigations and reviews allow direct monitoring of bureaucratic behaviour. As such, they imply clear and detailed mandates which fit a hierarchical understanding of their relationship, and the centrality of the politicians as policymakers. Police patrolling however frustrates agency expertise in implementation, imposes opportunity costs on the principals, and requires clear and stable policy preferences. Moreover, it leaves principals open to blame for agencies’ wrongdoings, which undermines their willingness to detect and punish – hence the credibility of the whole strategy (McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989; Hood 2002).
Alternatively, legislators can enfranchise third parties to monitor the decisions of the bureaucracy and ring the alarm in case of drift. These provisions can expose the agency to the same pressures that principals’ face when the relevant legislation was enacted, while ‘stacking the deck’ in favour of some constituency of concern to the principals. They can even provide an ‘autopilot’ to implementation when the agency’s preferences are forced to change together with those of the ‘enfranchised’ constituencies (McCubbins et al. 1989, Lupia and McCubbins 1994). These tools work to the extent that the principal’s preferences coincide with those of the enfranchised interests – thus fitting the idea of politicians as reactive servants of the affected constituencies (McCubbins et al., 1989, 1999). Fire alarms recognise the political relevance of implementation, constrain and reinforce the legitimacy of administrative behaviour, and guarantee that policy goods of interest are delivered even when political preferences are uncertain or mandates unclear, while sheltering the principals from blame. At the same time, the autopilot design may also provide opportunities for policy capture and reversal (Balla 1998). In short, the actual performance of fire alarm controls depends on how enfranchisement – that is, accountability rights and obligations – are designed and mixed (West, 2004; Carpenter and Moss, 2013; Mulgan 2003).
Unfortunately, the field is dominated by research on individual instruments. Analysis of administrative procedure acts (APA) is the bedrock of this literature (Baum, 2007; De Figueiredo and Vanden Berg, 2004; McCubbins et al, 1999) – especially of regulators’ obligations on the regulator to publish their plans and to give reasons for choice (Shapiro, 1988). A second strand of research concerns the adoption of freedom of information laws and associated participation rights, transparency and consultation obligations (Bignami, 2004). A third group of studies is concerned with judicial review, and the role of courts in regulatory policy (Galera, 2010). Finally, there is a body of work on the role of economics in the preparation of legislation – a form of ex-ante control of rulemaking that covers different usages of cost-benefit analysis and regulatory impact assessment (De Francesco et al., 2012; Radaelli, 2010; Shapiro and Morrall III, 2012). This literature has produced a fine-grained knowledge about individual instruments, but at the expense of the bigger picture. This leads to our research questions:
1.	What are the conceptual categories that assist us in the systematic identification and operationalization of fire alarm controls?
2.	How do fire alarms control packages vary across countries?
3.	What does cross-national variation tell us about the core question of governing the bureaucracy?

Analytical framework and data
Fire alarm provisions limit policy drift in the post-legislative phase by making agencies accountable to enfranchised constituencies. This basically means that such provisions give the agency an informational obligation to some relevant external accountee (Bovens, 2005; Mulgan, 2003).
Empirically, informational obligations can vary along two main dimensions. First, information about the agency operations can be made accessible to different degrees. Indeed, access can be given either to the information alone that the agency wants to disclose, or to all of the information it produces; either before or after the agency decision has passed; either with or without the rights to comment on it and be answered. Second, agency obligations to answer can vary meaningfully in real world. Agencies may be required to answer for the procedures they follow when deciding, rather than for the material reasons that informed their decisions; and they may be questioned by courts, special interests, experts and the general public.
Each of these differences has consequences. When agencies have already taken a decision, the fire alarm becomes the tool of last resort with interests confined to the role of ‘detectors’. Detectors’ signals of drift can be sent only after the agency defines a new policy equilibrium that principals may find it too costly to correct. Also, such signals are biased by design, as each enfranchised interest is sensitive to drifts from its narrow concerns – so that the more homogeneous the accountees, the easier for the agency to please them and the more likely the capture. For interests to become ‘effectors’, they have to be involved into an exchange of substantial information with the agency during rulemaking – which increases policy effectiveness the more and the separate the ‘accountability vectors’ are (Majone 2009; Carpenter and Moss 2014). If general interests and the public are set as fully answerable effectors, the agency will be more responsive and the policy outcome more legitimate (Shapiro, 1998) – although it may fall pretty far from the equilibrium point defined by the legislators.

We consider accessibility to vary according to the presence or absence of explicit:
(a) 	obligations for the rule-maker to notify that a decision has been made – or, in a stronger form, that a decision has been drafted but not yet passed;
(b) 	provisions for comments to be given on a regulatory proposal before it is passed, and the corresponding obligations for the regulator;
(c) 	enforceable rights of access to administrative information, and whether these rights are extended to any citizen regardless of their being able to demonstrate a legitimate direct interest in a given regulatory decision.

Following the same logic, answerability is defined by the presence or absence of explicit:
(d) 	provisions for a pre-legal material review to be made on the contents of a regulation, rather than for an abstract review concerned with the coherence of the proposal to the existing legal system; 
(e) 	obligations imposed on regulators to account for the correctness of the procedures followed, rather than to explain the substantial reasons underlying the specific content of the rule; 
(f) 	provisions to supplement rulemaking with explanatory notes, and the degree of publicity these notes shall be given; 
(g) 	obligations to support new policy proposals with robust evidence-base, typically a system for Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), in some countries extended to both agency regulation and legislative proposals made by the executive.

The literature highlights how the credibility of the enfranchising prescriptions strongly depends on their enforcement. Hence we focus on legal prescriptions alone, as they make negligence liable. This also suggests an important caveat: the more fire alarms rest on effective informal and customary practices, the more our data suffer from bias.
We gathered the above data for 17 countries in 2012. We have considered a population that is relatively homogeneous in terms of being exposed to transnational socialisation and other sources of diffusion and policy convergence (Pal, 2012) but still display variability on key dimensions such as administrative traditions, management reforms, legal origin, regulatory policy instruments (De Francesco et al., 2012). 

Each country-case can hence be represented as a special configuration of presence or absence of the discriminating provisions, as in table 1 below.

Table 1. Cases by discriminating provisions
	accessibility	answerability
country	notif_decision	notif_proposal	comments	feedback	FOI_enforceability	FOI_universality	ajr_pre-material	ajr_pre-abstract	justify_procedure	justify_content	reason_notes	reason_public	RIA_system	RIA_exttension
AUT	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
BEL	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CZE	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1
DEU	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0
DNK	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
ESP	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
FIN	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0
FRA	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
GRC	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0
IRL	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
ITA	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	0
NLD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
PLD	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0
PRT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
SLK	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
SWE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
UK	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Note: see online appendix 1 (​..​/​..​/​Documents​/​My Dropbox​/​AdminGovMap (1)​/​JEPP​/​damonte​/​AppData​/​Local​/​Temp​/​Insert hyperlink"HYPERLINK "..​/​..​/​damonte​/​AppData​/​Local​/​Temp​/​Insert hyperlink​) for details of coding and variable weighting.

The coding operationalises two opposite ideal types.
The first, in which all the devices are formally present for making a system fully accessible and answerable, scores 1 on each provision, and qualifies a completely accountable administration by fire alarms. In such a ‘fully accountable’ ideal type, the institutionalised delegation of control to third parties is the highest – indicating a preference for an administration directly responsive to interests as much as at risk of capture.
Its opposite, where none of the listed devices are formally laid down, displays 0 scores alone, and indicates an administrative process totally insulated from third parties by design. In such a ‘fully insulated’ ideal type, there is no external accountee and control is direct, via police patrol devices. As table 1 makes clear, these two ideal types do not correspond to any actual case in our population; nevertheless, they provide a useful guide for the following analysis (Goertz, 2006; Ragin, 1987).

Analysis and findings
As already noted, while no case is really lacking in fire alarms, none has adopted the complete set of devices that would make its administrative systems totally accountable – although Sweden, the Netherlands and Portugal display fully accessible administrative systems. A plot of our population by basic indexes of accessibility and answerability (calculated as the ratio of the number of present provisions out of their possible number; figure 1) also shows that formal devices for accessibility are preferred to those for answerability. This is especially true for Denmark and Slovakia, in the bottom-right corner, but all cases lay under or on the bisector except for Poland, Ireland, Belgium and UK. The last two cases also are the ones which rely less on formal provisions for accountability via fire alarms, as indicated by their position in the bottom-left corner; and are opposed to Sweden, Portugal, Germany, Spain and Finland in the top right, where accessibility and accountability indexes score higher. Indexes also generate some puzzling results: Spain and Finland share the same values, as well as Greece and France, and Austria and Italy.

Figure 1. Cases by accessibility and answerability indexes


Algebraic syntheses however shade the qualitative differences among cases – which also make the identity of cases questionable. For qualitative differences to be taken into account, a different strategy is needed that focuses on the configuration of devices instead of on their simple addition (Ragin, 1987).

Compressing to superconditions

Given the 14 provisions in our analysis, the overall typology can be thought as a 14-dimensional space; in which each country’s exact position is given by the value it scores on every provision (Barton, 1955) as in table 2. The result is a little fertile ‘individualisation’ of each country as a sui generis case (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009). Indeed, the analytical complexity can be reduced to cluster cases together into few yet meaningful groups. Such reduction is obtained by ‘compression’ (Elman 2005).
Compression is an especially delicate operation, as it already implies a classification effort – namely, the one ‘as a result of which different combinations fall into one class’ (Lazarsfeld and Barton 1951: 173). For parsimonious typologies to emerge, reduction ought to be driven by the meaning that configurations – or special parts of them – acquire in the light of the driving ideal-types. The original provisions can then be logically merged into ‘superconditions’ (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur, 2009), thus compressing the analytical space.
Compression works to: (a) find those variables that ‘express essentially the same underlying characteristic or have their effects in the same direction’ (Barton, 1955:46), (b) identify every configuration (type) resulting from the combination of the presence and absence of each variable, (c) assign to each type a ‘crisp score’ according to its logical proximity to one of the theoretical poles (Ragin, 2000).
We therefore consider our 14 variables by dimension, and compress each meaningful match into a supercondition, as follows​[2]​.

Accessibility
The analysis of accessibility investigates the degree to which agency operations are made accessible to interests as detectors or effectors.

(1)	<notifying>
First, a decision can be notified after it has been taken (notify_decision), or while it is in the making (notify_proposal). The combination of presence and absence of the two notifications hence generate four types, as follows:
	the type where no kind of notification is due scores 0, and refers to cases where such information is equally customary or dependent on the style of the government (UK BEL GRC IRL); 
	the type where both notifications are present and enforceable scores 1, and characterise cases where interests are given the opportunity to mobilise both at the beginning and at the end of the rulemaking (NLD DNK SWE ITA AUT DEU PRT ESP SLK);
	the one where the decision only has to be notified when it has been taken (PLD FRA FIN CZE) lies next to the 0-accessibility pole, as it enfranchises late detectors alone which still leave the agency the opportunity to drift;
	the type where information is due that there is a proposal of a new rule, but not that a rule has passed, is given 1 as the timing would give accountees the opportunity to become effectors. Yet, the type is unobserved as no case matches this configuration.

(2)	<commenting>
The second and related procedural point is whether accountees are given the right to comment (commenting), and to be answered (feedback). Together, the two provisions again generate the types: 
	where enforceable rights are recognised neither to comment nor to be answered (UK PLD BEL FRA IRL CZE), which so is given a score of 0;
	where the public can comment and be answered (NLD SWE PRT ESP), which scores 1;
	where the public is given the right to comment while the administrative body has no related obligation to answer (DNK ITA AUT DEU GRC FIN SLK), which is still assumed to lie next to the ‘full accessibility’ pole, as even though the administrative bodies do not really engage a dialogue with the affected interests, comments imply that drift can be avoided if there is a meaningful mobilization;
	the other mixed type is empirically empty and given a 0 score as, in such a nonsensical case, interests would be allowed to comment on something they had never been noticed.

(3)	<free>
The third super-condition revolves around whether there is a formal, enforceable right to access administrative information freely (FOI_enforceability), and whether such right is entitled to every citizen (FOI_universality). Without this, the agency can de facto maintain a veil of secrecy on a given case, even if there are customary practices of access. Therefore:
	the case where the right of information is both legally enforceable and universal scores 1, as the configuration fully enfranchises interests; it also is the most crowded (NLD DNK SWE PLD FRA DEU GRC IRL PRT FIN CZE SLK);
	the opposite case, where the right of information is neither recognized nor enforceable, scores 0 and has only Spain;
	the type where the right is given a legal basis but is not universally enforceable (ITA) may rather prove a catch 22 situation, as individuals cannot access administrative information unless they demonstrate their legitimate interest in it: yet, if there is no general access a citizen may not even be aware of their legitimate interest. This situation favours insiders only, hence is given a 0 score;
	the type where the right of access is not given a legal basis, but is recognized to every citizen (UK AUT BEL) –is assumed to favour interest accessibility, hence is given a crisp value of 1.


Answerability
The second dimension focuses on the many vectors of answerability as formal obligations to the administrative agencies. The model assumes that distinct professional and societal vectors compel administrative accountors to consider substantial concerns which may be at odds with the preferences of the political principal. Hence, few procedural answerability vectors (0 pole) insulate administration and strengthen direct political control, while many substantial vectors (1 pole) open administrative decisions to accountees’ concerns.

(4)	<reviewing>
The pre-legal judicial review can be material, if driven by a viability concern related to key affected interests (ajr_pre-material); or abstract, if revolves around the consistency of agency decisions with legal principles (ajr_pre-abstract). The latter mostly maintains agency decisions under the influence of elected politicians, while the former is sensitive to societal concerns. The combination of presence and absence of the two again generates four types:
	the one where no review is made (GRC) embodies the idea of the totally insulated administration where the political principal also is the only accountee, hence is given a score of 0. 
	the mixed type where the material review is made but not the abstract (BEL UK NLD DNK FIN IRL SWE) is given score 1, as here societal concerns are considered;
	where the two reviews exist (ESP PRT FRA PLD), the type does not make clear which of the concerns would prevail in case of conflict, or the degree to which a proposal’s content may change in response to the claims of the affected interests; however, the societal position is represented and consequently the system is expected to be answerable (1 score);
	where there is only abstract review, the type only leaves room for political concerns: hence the score of 0 that places the related cases (SLK CZE DEU ITA AUT) next to the insulated state administration.

(5)	<justifying>
Formal provisions may make the administrative bodies answerable for the procedure they follow (justify_procedure), or for the reasons underlying their decisions and behaviour (justify_content). The combination generates the following types:
	the one where no answerability obligation is formalised (UK BEL FRA IRL CZE). This type either characterises those cases whose administrative processes are led by customs, or closed systems where the burden of proof about the correctness of the administrative behaviour is not systematically laid on the agency itself – but is verified by more traditional practices such as inspections, which may feed into informational asymmetry and leave administrative operation non-answerable. The score is that of the insulated system pole, i.e. 0. 
	on the opposite, the one where agencies formally required to be transparent in both procedures and reasons (SWE PLD AUT DEU GRC PRT ESP) scores 1. 
	the mixed type where there is only transparency on procedures (SLK) is assumed to behave like the pure 0 type and given a score of 0, 
	the one where the substantive reasons alone have to be given publicly (NLD DNK ITA FIN) is considered answerable instead, hence given a score of 1.

(6)	<wide>
APA obligations may or not require agencies to provide reasons detailed in written notes (reason_notes), and notes addressed or not to the general public (reason_public). Again, we generate four types:
	where the agencies are required to detail to the public (NLD SWE FIN), the type follows the ‘answerable system’ rationale and is given a score of 1;
	if none of the two obligations are in formal rules (UK DNK PLD PRT CZE SLK), the type scores 0. 
	the obligation to detail, but not to the wide public, features cases similar to the insulated model, and score 0 (ITA AUT DEU GRC); 
	the type where the agencies are required to give their reason to the public, although not in detail (BEL FRA IRL ESP), is still deemed to lie near to the answerability pole, and consequently it scores 1.

(7)	<assessing>
The fully-fledged professional answerability embodied by RIA requires the technique to be run systematically across policy sectors (RIA_extension) and by a properly developed organizational system (RIA_system). The combination of the two generates the four types below:
	where the system is not developed and analytical techniques not applied (NLD AUT BEL ESP SLK), agencies do not follow evidence-based policy: their decisions may still be checked but according to the logic of political answerability. Consequently, the type is insulated and scores 0;
	the type where the RIA system is developed and widely applied (UK IRL CZE) gets a 1 score;
	a strong system, although used sporadically (DNK SWE PLD ITA DEU GRC FIN), may blur the relevance of political preferences, and is given a score of 1;
	a widely adopted tool by a scarcely developed system (FRA PRT) is a symbolic exercise, hence is given a score of 0.

Together, compression then generate a new dataset with seven superconditions – three operationalising accessibility and four rendering answerability (table 2).

Table 2. Cases by superconditions
	accessibility	answerability
country	notifying	commenting	freeing	reviewing	justifying	wide	assessing
AUT	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
BEL	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
CZE	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
DEU	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
DNK	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
ESP	1	1	0	1	1	1	0
FIN	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
FRA	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
GRC	0	1	1	0	1	0	1
IRL	0	0	1	1	0	1	1
ITA	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
NLD	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
PLD	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
PRT	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
SLK	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
SWE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UK	0	0	1	1	0	0	1


Exposing cross-country patterns

Now that we have obtained these super-conditions, we can explore the new dataset with two Venn diagrams​[3]​. Let us first consider figure 2, the answerability diagram. The diagram has four super-conditions that mirror the accountability vectors relevant for fire alarms. The super-condition about impact assessment (assessing) is based on economic evidence and cost-benefit analysis in rulemaking, which indicates answerability to experts (i.e. economists, social scientists, regulatory analysts) and, by extension, to interests that may not be properly represented in society, such as the preferences of new generations as reflected in the discount rate used in RIA. The super-condition reviewing is indicative of answerability to the affected interests. By contrast, the super-condition wide points towards answerability to the general public. Finally, the absence of the super-condition justifying takes us back to situations where only procedural mechanisms of answerability operate.

Figure 2. Venn diagram for answerability


Let us explore the diagram starting from the bottom region. Here lie those types formally committed to provide substantive justifications for their decisions.
In polar type 1111 (Sweden and Finland), not only is answerability substantial but also due to each of our possible accountees: unrepresented interests via experts, immediately affected interests, general public. Control by fire alarms is the highest, as well as the bureaucracy’s direct responsibility for delivery.
Type 1110, qualifying the Netherlands and Spain, displays broad substantial devices but excludes answerability to experts. Social groups and the general public are the agents’ relevant direct accountees: which, on the one hand, indicates social viability as upmost concern in the design of fire alarms, and on the other suggests the reliance of political principals on mobilised individual or collective interests alone for keeping administration on the track of effectiveness. As far as the distribution of mobilised interests matches those channelled by vote, this accessibility mix may provide minorities with further opportunities for voice.
Type 1101 (Poland and Denmark) maintains substantial obligations toward affected interests but, in contrast to the type above, has strong answerability to experts whilst the vector to the general public is weak. Here, agents are required to justify their decisions to selected interests and by economic evidence and cost-benefit analysis. If we assume that the concerns of the experts point to mid- to long-term sustainability whereas pressure by interest groups pushes towards the short-term, these vectors may oppose each other, arguably leaving political principals to arbitrate. The absence of direct answerability to the general public also indicates that the control mix actually operationalises the political principals as the proper upholder of general public interest.
Italy, Germany and Greece are instances of Type 0101, where answerability is substantial and due to experts alone – which suggests a concern for policy and/or international credibility. The absence of formalised societal vectors to affected interests and general public indicates the enduring centrality of the political principal in administration, which experts may hardly counterbalance from a position of plain ‘detector’. As much as agents are insensitive to experts’ blame, Type 0101 may equal Type 0100 (Austria), where substantial accountability is due, yet formally to no special accountor. The result is a highly symbolic design, from the perspective of fire alarms.
Let us now move to the top region of the Venn diagram. Here, administrative decisions need to be explained, but in procedural terms, rather than substantially. We expect justifications to be less relevant substantially – and this should affect the capacity of societal accountees to be automatically informed about agency drift from their concerns. Further, this situation suggests that the substance of decision is a matter restricted to the interplay of bureaucratic agents and political principals, and of informal relationships with special interests – something which may not be really compensated in the accessibility dimension.
In this region, type 0000 (made true by Slovakia) lacks any kind of devices for answerability. The type explicitly does not recognise any accountee – but, implicitly, political principals. Type 0001 (Czech Republic) only makes agencies answerable via experts: so, political control seems partially corrected by those fire alarms which only enhance the credibility of the rulemaking.
Similar but more pluralist conditions are found in the type 1001 (UK) where, apart from experts, affected interests are also considered as effectors via pre-legal review on the content of the rulemaking. Type 1011 (Ireland) adds the public vector to the previous model, although with reduced effectiveness as citizens are addressed notes about the procedure only. In Type 1010 (Belgium and France) again the vectors of answerability enfranchise special interests on contents and the public on the procedure, while the anchor to experts is weak: thus it seems a variation on the theme of politically controlled legislation cautiously open to those fire alarms alone that can secure domestic viability.
Answerability however provides ‘detectors’ alone. It established obligations to consider the preferences of some accountee when taking decision, but it does not commit regulators to any meaningful policy consequence. For fire alarms to be effective we ought to introduce instruments which give accountees the timely knowledge they need about the rulemaking to mobilise properly and see their concerns considered – what the accessibility dimension operationalises (figure 3).

Figure 3. Venn diagram: cases distribution by accessibility


Let us start from the 111 region inside the diagram. The procedures in this Type are the closest we can imagine to the ideal-type of a formally accessible administrative system: agencies are fully open to the scrutiny of interests, and responsive to their concerns. Interestingly enough, it also is the most crowded configuration. The opposite type 000 portrays administrative systems where scrutiny is only possible via the mediation of the political principal: a logically possible case, but empirically empty.
In Type 001 (UK, IRL, PLD, BEL, FRA, CZE), freedom of information is provided, but nothing else. Citizens have the right to scrutinise the administration, but are neither notified decisions nor formally given a say on it, which excludes them from the rulemaking. The Type thus formally recognises detectors alone, and maintains the centrality of political principals as mediators between citizens’ voice and the administrative process.
Type 011 (Greece and Finland) displays formalised provisions for access to information, and to comment and feedback, but does not oblige the regulator to notify that a decision is either been drafted or made. Certainly, more in-depth qualitative work is necessary to understand the logic behind type 011, but again we can infer a preference for a control strategy which allows public inspection of the delivery package and exposes agencies to their voice, yet leaves the timing of accessibility to evaluations of political opportunity, or to customs. The mix suggests the relevance of other, direct, strategies for bureaucratic control from political principals.
Italy and Spain belong to type 110. This looks like a ‘catch-22’ situation. Notification and comment are present, but there is no right of free access to administrative information. Here, citizens first must demonstrate a specific interest that is affected by a regulation to access to information: but without such information they cannot even be aware of their interest. The only groups who could exert these rights hence are ‘administrative insiders’, who would not need them anyway. Accessibility in type 110 is most likely symbolic, de facto restating the relevance of political preferences in rulemaking.
Types 101 and 100 are especially telling ‘logical remainders’, i.e. unobserved configurations. They indicate that there are no cases in our population where strong obligations to notify are present but the comment cycle is not – no matter the free access to administrative acts. This implies a comprehensible lack of reasons for establishing a duty to notify decisions without a matching obligation to hear from citizens and answer. The reverse is not true however, as Greece and Finland in type 011 indicate. The ‘notice-and-comment’ cycle hence seems the fire alarm provision whose diffusion can be ascribed to mimetic responses to international fads more than to actual problem-driven designs.

Discussion and Conclusions
This article has argued that one way to cope with power dispersion is to draw on fire alarm systems. The other, more direct approach is police patrol. While the latter is the more obvious and traditional form of control, it can be blunt. We have explored the logic behind fire alarms, considering a wide range of instruments. We have uncovered cross-country patterns by using theoretically-grounded concepts that can be operationalised. One assumption we made in concept formation is that control by fire alarms is attractive to politicians but it carries cost; thus, hardly all the logically possible fire alarms will be activated.
In the end, governments will choose on the basis of their preferences for a more or less deep accountability to a more or less wide array of accountees. Accountability via fire alarms has thus been conceptualised as the accessibility of interests to the rulemaking, and agency answerability to them. Our findings on cross-country variations suggest that all political principals have granted some form of accessibility; beyond this, different strategies appear at work beneath the deployment of fire alarms. This stands in contrast to the notion that the EU and the OECD are formidable platforms for policy transfer, and that ideas and paradigms have diffused administrative tools across countries. Diffusion is clustered, and there is definitively no convergence.
These findings are at odds with the tabloid version of new public management and neo-liberal ideas that dominate public policy across countries: these ideas may be persistent, but the actual choices of governments differ markedly. Also, such variation in fire alarms hardly support the thesis that European administrations cluster in special ‘families’ (Castles, 1999) or traditions (Peters, 2008). This map however stresses the need to analyse consolidated typologies with empirical rigor (though see Obinger and Wagschal, 2001). For example, beyond the two null configurations and four where only a single country is found, there are only two types were some members of a single Castleian administrative family are found (and in these cases we must set the new Eastern European democracies to one side). Indeed, in ten of the remaining 20 types, we find complex combinations of countries from three or four families (plus Eastern European states). This underlines the need to analyse consolidated typologies with empirical rigor (though see Obinger and Wagschal, 2001).
With this respect, our findings contribute to the field methodologically, empirically and theoretically. Methodologically, we have developed explanatory typologies by logical compression of the property space. Our indexing procedure shows how to proceed rigorously in key analytical steps in explanatory typologies.
Theoretically, our framework addresses the issue of administrative control by fire alarms from the perspective of accountability, so moving beyond the analysis of single administrative procedural instruments to make sense of instrument mixes instead. Configurations of provisions thus come to represent different types of accessibility and answerability of the rulemaking.
Empirically, our cartographic infrastructure provides the background for explicit explanatory analyses. One could run our data against a given outcome, a possible question being whether our superconditions are necessary and sufficient to system performance such as competitiveness or trust. Another option is to proceed by qualitative analysis of individual cases, matching our findings with data on the implementation of the different rights, instruments, and obligations. In this connection, much remains to be investigated on the relationship between procedure and substance – individual case studies on implementation have much to say on this. Indeed, our findings focused on the presence and absence of legal outputs only, which may be different from their implementation. Also, we coded the last available information, regardless of when each provision was introduced, and in which sequence. More fundamentally, we have assumed that low fire alarms imply direct political control, yet not proven it; and casted a blind spot on informal accessibility from corruption and clientelism (Piattoni, 2001). For theorists of democracy, the real question is whether there is a trade-off between controlling with the instruments of administrative law and controlling via corruption and clientelism – essentially, a trade-off between rule of law and illegal practice. To all these questions, our map and types can nevertheless provide either the explanandum or the explanans.
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